An article in Housing Policy Debate, “Failing the Least Advantaged: An Unintended Consequence of Local Implementation of the Housing Choice Voucher Program,” finds that two practices for managing waitlists for housing assistance—prioritizing local applicants and purging waitlists when applicants fail to respond to follow-up requests mailed to addresses on file—can disadvantage applicants who are likelier to experience residential instability. The author argues that such practices can unintentionally direct scarce resources toward applicants who are comparatively better off, since poorer households are more likely to need to move while on a waitlist.
The author collected housing choice voucher (HCV) administrative plans from 59 public housing agencies (PHAs) in Michigan. The administrative plans describe how local PHAs manage their HCV waitlists and prioritize voucher applicants. To better understand these waitlist management practices, the author conducted 12 interviews with PHA directors and HCV program managers. To determine whether poorer households experience more residential instability, the author analyzed the duration of residence of 8,092 renters who were income-eligible for the HCV program in the Census Bureau’s 2014 Survey of Income and Program Participation.
Among the PHA administrative plans, 44% prioritize applicants already living or working in the local municipality. PHAs with a residency preference require applicants to indicate their eligibility for preferential treatment when applying and to verify their address when they reach the top of the waitlist. As a result, those who can remain stably housed within the local municipality during an extended waiting period are more likely to benefit from this preference. Analysis of interviews with PHA directors suggested that the input of city government officials and a desire to serve local residents over applicants from nearby bigger cities (like Detroit or Ann Arbor) may encourage PHAs to adopt residency preferences.
All of the PHAs used mail contact as a method of maintaining their waitlists. The typical procedure involves sending an annual update request to the address on file for each household on the waitlist, which requires the household to respond within a specified length of time to prevent being purged from the waitlist. None of these PHAs send reminders to return the update request, use multiple modes of contact, or provide many exceptions for reinstatement outside of PHA error if the applicant is removed from the waitlist. In interviews, PHA directors indicated that underfunding and the consequent need to limit administrative burden on the agency prevent them from making additional efforts to reach applicants. Applicants who move more frequently must regularly update their information with the PHA, or else they risk not receiving an update request, which could lead to being purged from the waitlist.
Analysis of the Survey of Income and Program Participation found that poorer renters were more likely to need to move. Forty-five percent of renters who were income-eligible for the HCV program moved at least once between 2013 and 2015, and nearly 14% moved at least twice. Compared with those who did not move, those who moved were more likely to have incomes below 150% of the federal poverty level. Supplementary analysis of the 5-year 2016 American Community Survey (ACS) supports this conclusion: about 35% of households with incomes less than 50% of the poverty level moved in the past year, compared to 25% of households with incomes above 150% of the poverty level.
If residential instability, which is more likely among the lowest-income renters, increases applicants’ chances of being dropped from waitlists for housing assistance, then scarce resources may be distributed to eligible households with higher incomes. Considering the financial constraints PHAs face, there may be few ways to revise administrative practices to limit this selective attrition from waitlists. Greater funding for PHAs and interorganizational collaboration among PHAs may make waitlist management processes more efficient and avoid disadvantaging the poorest applicants. Fully funding the voucher program, such that all eligible applicants receive assistance, would also ensure that those with the greatest need are not left out.
The paper can be found at: https://bit.ly/3mnKBZi